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THE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, AND THE PUBLIC: 
LEADERSHIP VERSUS DIALOGUE* 
Michael E. Solimine** 
James L. Walker*** 
[T]he most interesting thing about the great flag-burning 
debate of the late 1980s would be how quickly that debate 
evaporated . ... 
. . . I can't even remember what my own opinion was on the flag 
issue, though I remember I had a strong one. 
-P.J. O'Rourke! 
In his article, Dialogue and Judicial Review,z Barry Fried-
man poses a trenchant challenge to some received wisdom of 
American constitutional law. Much constitutional discourse is 
predicated on the assumption that the United States Supreme 
Court is a counter-majoritarian institution, and normative theo-
ries supporting the exercise of judicial review are seen, by some, 
as having to accommodate that fact. Many writers make this ac-
commodation by showing that the other branches of government 
are not majoritarian.J Friedman takes a different tack. Accord-
ing to Friedman, the assumption of counter-majoritarianism is 
wrong, for there are several indicia that the Court is a 
majoritarian political institution and in particular that it does re-
spond to, and in turn influences, public opinion. 
Thus, as Friedman notes, the Court sometimes makes refer-
ence to legislative enactments among the various states when 
* Copyright © 1994 by Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker. 
** Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., 1978, Wright 
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1. P.J. O'Rourke, Parliament of Whores: A Lone Humorist Attempts to Explain the 
Entire U.S. Government 77 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991). 
2. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993). 
3. See Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and 
the Process of Adjudication 28-30 (Yale U. Press, 1990). 
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rendering a decision;4 "[p]ublic opinion polls establish that, con-
trary to common thought, judicial decisions often gamer substan-
tial public support";s and polls show that the public, in general, 
holds the Court in high regard.6 Moreover, the public can indi-
rectly influence judicial decisions through the appointment pro-
cess, since Presidents usually nominate Justices with compatible 
ideologies.7 In short, "[t]he Court facilitates and shapes the con-
stitutional debate''s since its decisions are generally consistent 
with, and to some extent formative of, the public's views of the 
issues which reach the Court. 
Friedman's contribution to our understanding of constitu-
tional law is important because it focuses on the supposed empir-
ical underpinnings of the counter-majoritarian assumption. 
Unfortunately, we think that Friedman's use and interpretation 
of social science data is partially flawed. That data is more com-
plex and nuanced than he indicates, and this fact calls into ques-
tion the breadth of some of the conclusions he reaches.9 
First, the polling data with respect to public support of par-
ticular decisions is, at best, equivocal. As Friedman himself 
notes, with some cases, such as the flagbuming decisions of 1989 
and 1990,10 solid majorities of the public seem to be opposed to 
the results.u Many other decisions, in contrast, receive support 
in the polls. But on the whole, the data does not tell us much. 
The leading work is that of Thomas Marshall, who has associated 
the results of 139 decisions in fully argued Court cases to nation-
wide polls on those cases. Of that number, about 55% were con-
sistent with the will of the majority as revealed by the poll.t2 This 
percentage is hardly awe-inspiring, and may, in fact, just as easily 
4. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev at 597 (cited in note 2). The best example is the 
Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 
5. ld. at 607. 
6. Id. at 624. 
7. I d. at 675-76. 
8. ld. at 654. 
9. To be sure, Friedman frames his article as a response to the legal community, 
and not to political scientists as such. ld. at 586 n.41. Nonetheless, his project is explicitly 
a descriptive one, and he refers at several points to studies by political scientists, including 
a number discussed in this paper. ld. at 624 n.235 (citing works by Marshall and Caldeira 
and Gibson). Thus, we are evaluating him on his own terms. 
10. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
11. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 605-06 (cited in note 2). 
12. Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court 71-79 (Unwin Hy-
man, 1989) (data from 1935-1986) ("Supreme Court") (if "unclear" decisions are not in-
cluded, agreement rises to 63% in the years 1935-86); Thomas R. Marshall, Public 
Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, 74 Judicature 322 (1991) (data from 1986-1990) ("Rehn-
quist Court"). 
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be used to demonstrate a lack of public support for the Court's 
decisions. There are also several other problems attendant to 
such associations: only a tiny fraction of Court decisions have 
been studied, and the polling questions themselves, of necessity, 
often oversimplify the holding of a case.tJ Moreover, the vast 
majority of Court decisions escape the scrutiny of public opinion 
polls entirely. 
It may be true that the polls tell us that the Court possesses 
relatively high levels of public prestige and support, especially as 
compared with other American institutions.l4 One recent study 
found a high correlation over the past three decades between the 
ideological mood of the public and all Court decisions, when the 
latter are categorized as either liberal or conservative.ts But 
here, too, the evidence is equivocal. The Court's public support 
has declined during periods, such as the Warren era, when the 
Court rendered controversial decisions, some of which engen-
dered significant public opposition.t6 Likewise, the Court's pub-
lic support is largely diffuse and, with the exception of opinion 
leaders, seems largely divorced from the satisfaction of particular 
policy preferences.17 One might say that the Court receives the 
most public support just when it needs it the least. 
Finally, we think that Friedman's metaphor of an interactive 
dialogue between the Court and public is, at best, incomplete. 
He envisions the Court as rendering decisions, which generate 
reaction among attentive publics, such as Congress. Congress 
might then make laws which, in turn, may be subject to legal 
challenge and eventually reach the Court again. The Court may 
thus be viewed as synthesizing and focusing the debate over im-
portant public issues, and as placing issues on the policy 
agenda.ts 
This normatively appealing vision, taken at its broadest, is 
premised on several unrealistic assumptions. The public at large 
is uninformed about the Court or its decisions, and indeed large 
13. Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in John B. Gates and Charles 
A. Johnson, eds., The American Courts: A Critical Assessment 303, 304-13 (Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1991). 
14. Marshall, Rehnquist Court at 326 (cited in note 12). 
15. William Mischler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993). 
16. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Con-
fidence in the Supreme Court, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1209 (1986). 
17. Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for 
the Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635, 658-59 (1992). 
18. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 669-70 (cited in note 2). 
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segments of the public possess incorrect knowledge about Court 
decisions.t9 Much of the blame can probably be assigned to the 
news media, whose reporting on court decisions is almost invaria-
bly dominated by sound bites.w But some of the blame might 
also rest with members of the other branches of government who 
distort the Court's decisions for political gain. 
Friedman's principal examplezt of the Court as a facilitator 
of debate, Roe v. Wade and its progeny, is not a compelling one. 
Whatever else one thinks about the decision, the dialogue it set 
off seems to have, to this day, largely polarized the public over 
the entire abortion issue. That is, especially with regard to the 
legality and public funding of discretionary abortions, the pro-life 
and pro-choice factions appeared to have hardened their respec-
tive positions.zz The dialogue metaphor is also weakened by the 
lack of any apparent direct causal mechanism between the Court 
and the public. To be sure, there are indirect mechanisms identi-
fied by Friedman, such as the appointment of Justices by like-
minded Presidents. Similarly, any judge is a product of her envi-
ronment, and surely social and political mores, which change 
over time, are reflected in the Justice's decisions in cases. 
But having said that, there is little or no explicit recognition 
in the Court's decisions that public opinion, or previous or antici-
pated public reaction, is a driving force. In some areas, substan-
tive doctrines are informed by indicia of public sentiment.23 But 
19. Marshall, Supreme Coun at 142-46 (cited in note 12). Compare Christopher L. 
Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Coun an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961, 1007-10 
(1992) (arguing that at least some of public is competent enough to engage in dialogue 
with the Court); Charles H. Franklin, Liane C. Kosaki and Herbert M. Kritzer, The Sali-
ence of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 25 (delivered at annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2-5, 1993) (on file with authors) 
(new polling data shows that "[t]he picture of the public as minimally aware and generally 
ignorant of the Court's actions is ... simply wrong."). 
20. Elliot E. Slotnick, Media coverage of Supreme Court decision making: problems 
and prospects, 75 Judicature 128 (1991). Elliot E. Slotnick and Jennifer A. Segal, Televi-
sion News and the Supreme Coun (delivered at annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 3-6, 1992) (on file with authors). 
21. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 647-48, 658-68 (cited in note 2). 
22. Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. 
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 751 (1989). For 
similar conclusions drawn about the abortion debate, see Ruth Colker, Abonion & Dia-
logue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and American Law 114-25 (Ind. U. Press, 1992); Mary Ann 
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 164-68 (The Free Press, 
1991); Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 175-77 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1988). It was precisely her view that Roe v. Wade may have had this effect that 
has raised questions about Ruth Bader Ginsburg's commitment to abortion rights. See 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381-86 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial 
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1199-1209 (1992). 
23. Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 597 (cited in note 2). 
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the vast majority of opinions make no allusion to this factor.z4 
Indeed, the Court will often take pains to point out that the law 
demands a result, irrespective of popular win.zs And, as in a 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,z6 
sometimes the Court seems to be explicitly leading, rather than 
following, the public.27 It is difficult to demonstrate, in any sort 
of systematic way, that public opinion influences Court decision-
making.zs 
Despite our reservations, we agree with Friedman's broad 
conclusions. But we think the overall data about public opinion 
leads to a restatement of the problem. Majoritarianism is not a 
dichotomous variable, but is instead continuous. It is dangerous 
for any branch, elected or not, to be too majoritarian. In our 
political culture, references are often made to the "tyranny of the 
majority."z9 Over time, over generations,3o the Court is as 
majoritarian as any other branch of government is, or ought to 
be. One of the functions of leadership is to create new majori-
ties, and the Court has a leadership role as important as that of 
any other branch of government, as measured by public support 
and acceptance (or acquiescence) in its decisions. 
Shifting majorities of the public do disagree with many deci-
sions, to the extent they perceive them, or are simply ignorant of 
24. See Marshall, Supreme Court at 31-55 (cited in note 12); Marshall, Rehnquist 
Coun at 327-28 (cited in note 12). 
25. Examples are legion. One relevant one is United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310, 318 (1990) ("any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech 
becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First 
Amendment."). 
26. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992). 
27. ld. at 2816 (Opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (Court will "speak 
before all others for [the American people's] constitutional ideals."). Cf. id. at 2882 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this 
language as a "Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a 
Yolk .... "). 
28. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model 240 (Cambridge U. Press, 1993). 
29. The term tyranny of the majority is often associated with the 19th century de 
Tocqueville, but it actually dates as far back, at least, as the debates over ratification of 
the Constitution. ("A bill of rights ... serves to secure the minority against the usurpa-
tion and tyranny of the majority .... [E]xperience ... has proved the prevalence of a 
disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual 
against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy.") Winthrop, the 
Letters of Agrippa, XVIII (1788), in Essays on The Constitution of the United States 115, 
117 (P. Forded. 1892 & photo. reprint 1970), quoted in Introduction, in The Antifederal-
ists xciii (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). 
30. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Bills of Rights and Regression to the Mean, 15 Harv. 
J. Law & Pub. Pol'y 71, 72-73 (1992). 
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the great mass of the Court's jurisprudence.3t But this is also 
true of many decisions of the House of Representatives, arguably 
(at least by design) the most majoritarian of the branches. As 
just one example, it has been widely reported that a high percent-
age of the public favors some sort of federal law controlling 
handguns. Such legislation never gets out of committee.3z 
Recent developments, such as the continued salience of the 
abortion issue, and the nominations of Robert Bork and Clar-
ence Thomas,33 may well raise public consciousness of the activi-
ties of the Court as many interest groups appear to seek to 
capture it for their own purposes. Ironically, while we think the 
data available is inconclusive, it might well be that the public in 
the future will demand an even more majoritarian Court, per-
haps to our deep regret.34 
31. As Friedman points out, some of his discussion is akin to a dialogic vision of the 
Court's statutory interpretation jurisprudence and the response of Congress. Friedman, 
91 Mich. L. Rev. at 581 n.16 (cited in note 2). In that regard, it is worth noting that many 
congressional overrulings of statutory cases are driven by interest groups. Michael E. 
Solimine and James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 425, 449 (1992). 
32. See Felicity Barringer, Majority in Poll Back Ban on Handguns, N.Y. Times, 
June 4, 1993, at A14. See generally Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of 
Public Opinion on Policy, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 175 (1983). 
33. See L. Marvin Overby, et al., Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate 
Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 997 (1992); Kath-
leen Frankovic and Joyce Gelb, Public Opinion and the Thomas Nomination, 25 PS 481 
(1992). 
34. Cf. Caldeira & Gibson, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 659 (cited in note 17) ("To the 
extent that the Court becomes politicized or perceived as such, it risks cutting itself off 
from its natural reservoir of goodwill and may become reliant for basic institutional sup-
port on those who profit from its policies"). 
